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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
porations organized under the laws of the state of Washington. The
statute as a whole does not answer this question but arguably it would
seem to be the intention of the draftsman to free all corporations from
the case law restriction.
The problems caused by the 1947 amendment could have been easily
prevented by clear draftsmanship. The amendment could have simply
provided that the corporation could repurchase shares under the
same circumstances and to the same extent as must exist for the
lawful payment of dividends. It is to be hoped that in some future
revision of the statute the legislature will take care to integrate the
repurchase provisions into the main body of the act.
JOHN HOOVER
CRIMINAL LAW
Indigent's Right to a Free Transcript for Use on Appeal. The
effect of Griffin v. Illinois,' a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, on the present Washington rules for furnishing an
indigent a free stenographic transcript for use on appeal was in issue
in In re Grady v. Schneckloth.2 Therein the petitioner made the bald
assertion that the Griffin decision requires that the state furnish him,
as an indigent, a free stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings
for use on appeal. The Washington court rejected this contention
and denied the application for a writ of habeas corpus.
In the Griffin case, after being convicted of armed robbery, the
petitioners moved in the trial court that they be furnished with a free
transcript for use on appeal. This motion was denied, as Illinois had
no provision for furnishing a convicted indigent with a transcript at
public expense in non-capital cases. This denial was affirmed on appeal
to the state courts. The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.' In the Supreme Court, Illinois conceded that the petitioners
needed a transcript to get an adequate review of the alleged trial
errors, and the court was compelled to "assume for purposes of this
decision that errors were committed in the trial which would merit
reversal, but that the petitioners could not get appellate review of
those errors solely because they were too poor to buy a stenographic
transcript."4 Under those circumstances the court held that the peti-
tioners had been deprived of the guarantees of the due process and
1351 U.S. 12 (1955).
2150 Wash. Dec. 806, 314 P.2d 930 (1957). For a subsequent case with practically
identical facts see In re Ross v Rhay, 151 Wash. Dec. 379, 318 P.2d 975 (1957).
3 349 U.S. 937.
4 351 U.S. 12 at 16.
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equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
pointed out that while the due process clause does not require a state
to provide appellate review, if the state does provide such a review, a
denial of review to an individual because of his indigence is a denial
of equal protection of the laws. However, the court cautioned that
they did not hold that the state must provide a transcript in every case
where a defendant cannot buy one, but that "the (Illinois) Supreme
Court may find other means of affording adequate and effective
appellate review to indigent defendants."
5
As the petitioner in In re Grady made no attempt to show that a
transcript was necessary for an adequate review, but relied on the
sole contention that the Griffin decision requires that a state furnish a
convicted indigent with a free transcript as a matter of right, the
Washington court was manifestly correct in concluding that the peti-
tioner had been deprived of no constitutional right as interpreted by
the Griffin case.8 The court went on to discuss the Washington statu-
tory provision' whereby an indigent may get a transcript at public
expense, and pointed out that in many cases an indigent can perfect
an appeal without the use of a transcript by employing either a "short
record" or a "narrative statement." Apparently feeling that these
provide an indigent with an adequate opportunity for review, the court
concluded that "the very basis of the Griffin case is completely and
entirely absent."'
It is submitted that the Griffin decision is not without effect on
Washington law. In Washington a complete stenographic transcript
is not required for the record on review.9 Illinois' provisions are sub-
stantially similar.1" The concession by Illinois in the Griffin case that
it was sometimes impossible to prepare the record required for review
5351 U.S. 12 at 20.8 The same contention was rejected in People v. Lumpkin, 158 N.Y.S2d 610 (1956).
7 See note 11, infra.
8 150 Wash. Dec. 806 at page 812.
9 Rule on Appeal 34, 34A Wn.2d 36. Rule 34 (3) (appeal on short record) provides
that ". .. so much of the evidence as bears upon the question or questions sought to be
reviewed may be brought before this by a statement of facts without bringing up the
evidence bearing on rulings on which no error is assigned." Rule 34 (4) (appeal on
agreed statement of facts) provides that the ". . parties may prepare and sign a state-
ment of the case showing how the question or questions arose and were decided in the
trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or sought
to be proved as are essential to a decision of the question or questions by this court...."
10I1!. Rev. Stats. ch. 110 § 101.36 (S. Ct. Rule 36) 1956). § 101.36 (1) (d)
(agreed statement of facts) provides that "in lieu of a report of proceedings, the
parties may be written stipulation agree upon a statement of the facts material to the
controversy and present the statement any judge qualified to certify to the correctness
of a report of the proceedings in said case, for his certificate of correctness, and file
the same...."
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without the aid of a transcript11 would probably hold true in Wash-
ington. This was not denied by the court in In re Grady. What of the
adequacy of Washington law in a case where a transcript is required
for an adequate review? In Washington, unlike Illinois at the time
of the conviction of the petitioners in the Griffin case, a convicted
indigent may be furnished with a transcript at public expense if in
the opinion of the trial judge "justice will thereby be promoted." 2
This is a power given to the trial judge by statute. 3 The Washington
court has repeatedly held that an indigent has no right to a free tran-
script aside from this statute, and the statute gives the trial judges
sole discretion, the exercise of which they refuse to review." Thus, in
a non-capital case, 5 whether an indigent will get a transcript at public
expense lies in the undisturbed discretion of the trial judge.
Inasmuch as the Griffin case holds that if a transcript is required for
an adequate review an indigent has a constitutional right to a tran-
script, it would appear that the trial judge may not justifiably refuse
an indigent's request if, in fact, a transcript is required for an adequate
review. A denial by the trial judge of an indigent's request for a tran-
script may involve a denial of a constitutional right, and, as such,
must be subjected to a review.
The review must primarily involve an inquiry into the propriety
of the trial judge's conclusion that a transcript is not required for
an adequate review, such a conclusion being the only justifiable reason
for denying the indigent's request. Two cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court subsequent to the Griffin case reached this con-
clusion in dealing with a denial of the indigent's request in the Federal
courts, and further indicated that the indigent must be furnished with
adequate means of showing the appellate court that the trial judge's
conclusion was erroneous."8 What this means is that it may be neces-
1 See 351 U.S. 12 at 13 and 14.
12 See RCW 3.32240 which provides, inter alia: "That when the defendant in
any criminal case shall present to the judge presiding satisfactory proof by affidavit
or otherwise that he is unable to pay for such transcript, the judge presiding, if in
his opinion justice will thereby be promoted, may order said transcript to be made
by the official reporter, which transcript fee therefore shall be paid out of the county
treasury as other expenses of the court are paid."
13 RCW 2.32. See note 11, supra.
'4 See State ex rel. Marr v. Superior Court, 163 Wash. 459, 1 P.2d 331 (1931);
State ex rel. Bird v. Superior Court, 30 Wn.2d 785, 194 P.2d 374 (1948) ; and In re
Mason v. Cranor, 42 Wn.2d 610, 257 P2d 211 (1953). Cf. State ex rel. Bird v.
Superior Court, 30 Wn2d 110, 190 P2d 762 (1948).
15 In capital cases a "proposed statement of facts" is furnished to the indigent at
the expense of the county as an incident to an appeal in forma pauperis which is granted
by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. See Rule on Appeal 47, 34A Wn.2d 53.
's Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957) and Farley v. United States 354
U.S. 521 (1957).
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sary for the state to furnish the indigent with a transcript in order
that the indigent may obtain an adequate review of the trial judge's
denial of a transcript in the first instance!
It is interesting to note that the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that, as a practical matter, compliance with the Griffin decision in-
volved furnishing all convicted indigents with a transcript for use on
their appeal,"' and adopted a rule to that effect 18
VICTOR V. HOFF
Maximum Sentence for Felony Where No Penalty Provided by Prescribing Statute.
In re Klapproth v. Squier, 50 Wn.2d 675, 314 P2d 430 (1957), paved the way for a
rash of applications for writs of habeas corpus during the past year. Therein the
supreme court ruled that the maximum sentence that may be imposed for the crime
of taking a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner (RCW 9.54.020) is ten
years as provided by RCW 9.92.010, which states:
"Every person convicted of a felony for which no punishment is specially pre-
scribed by any statutory provision in force at the time of conviction and sentence,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten
years.... "
RCW 9.54.020, making it a crime to take a motor vehicle without the permission of
the owner, is one of a group of felony statutes that prescribe neither a maximum nor
a minimum penalty, but provide only that the violator "shall be guilty of a felony."
The Klapprotlh decision expressly overruled It re Mfacduff v. Cranor, 42 Wn2d 488,
256 P.2d 293 (1953), noted in 29 WAsH. L. REv. 109, which held that the correct
sentence to be imposed for a violation of RCW 9.54.020 was twenty years, under RCW
9.95.010 which provides:
"When a person is convicted of any felony, ... the court shall sentence such person
to the penitentiary.., and shall fix the maximum term of such person's sentence
only... The maximum term to be fixed by the court shall be the maximum pro-
vided by law for the crime of which such person was convicted, if the law provides
for a maximum term. If the law does not provide a maximum term for the crime
of which such person was convicted the court shall fix such maximum term...
but in any case where the maximum term is fixed by the court it shall be fixed at
not less than twenty years."
In re Macduff held that RCW 9.95.010, first enacted in 1935, impliedly overruled
RCW 9.92.010, a 1909 statute. The Klapproth decision held that this was incorrect.
The court concluded that the statutes can be read together by interpreting RCW
9.92.010 as fixing the maximum term for felonies where no term is fixed by the statute
defining the crime. This interpretation endows such felonies with a "maximum pro-
vided by law" and takes them outside the scope of RCW 9.95.010. This leaves RCW
9.95.010 to apply only to felonies where the prescribing statute fixes a minimum term
but not a maximum term.
As a result of the much needed Klapproth holding, the "not less than twenty year"
maximum required by RCW 9.95.010 is limited to those felonies for which the defining
statute provides only a minimum sentence-generally the more heinous felonies such
as first degree arson and second degree murder. The maximum term for a violation
17 See the historical note to Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 § 101.65-1 (S. Ct. Rule 65-1)
(1956) pages 617 et seq.
18 Supreme Court Rule 65-1, Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 § 101.65-1 (1956).
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of those "statutory" felonies which provide that the violator "shall be guilty of a
felony" is ten years.
Since the Klapproth decision at least five other writs of habeas corpus have been
filed by persons convicted under statutes prescribing no penalty and sentenced to the
"not less than twenty years" minimum. In each case, the supreme court, on the
strength of the Klapproth holding, has directed a reduction in the sentence to a maxi-
mum of ten years.
Criminal Law-Waiver of Right to Counsel. The question of when an accused has
competently and completely waived his right to counsel was before the court on four
different occasions in 1957. In In re Wilken v. Squier, 50 Wn2d 58 309 P2d 746, the
court held that when the accused had not been expressly informed of his right to have
counsel furnished at public expense, he could not make a competent and complete
waiver. In In re Klapproth v. Squier, 50 Wn2d 675, 314 P.2d 430 the court wavered
a bit from the Wilken holding, deciding that when the accused was not expressly
informed of his right to have counsel, but had been repeatedly asked if he desired the
aid of counsel, his refusal constituted a competent waiver. Finley, J. dissented,
urging that because the accused had not been expressly informed of his right to have
counsel there could be no competent waiver.
The subsequent cases of In re Friedbauer v. State, 151 Wash. Dec. 77, 316 P.2d 117,
and State v. Dechanne, 151 W. Dec. 227, 317 P.2d 527, strongly reaffirmed In re Wilkin
v. Squier, flatly holding that the accused mut have been informed of his right to have
counsel at public expense before he may be held to have made a competent waiver. As
a result of these last two decisions, it may fairly be said that anything in the Klapproth
case indicating that an accused may waive his right to counsel without being informed
of this right has been overruled, and it must be taken as settled that unless the court
informs the accused of his right to have counsel at public expense, there can be no
competent waiver.
The Wilken case indicated that before an accused may be held to have waived his
right to counsel the court must: (1) inform the defendant that it is his right to have
counsel before being arraigned; (2) ascertain whether because of the defendant's
poverty he is unable to employ counsel, in which event, the court must inform the
defendant that the court shall appoint counsel for the defendant at public expense if
he so desires; (3) ask whether the defendant desires the aid of counsel.
Juvenile Court-Delinquency Proceeding. In re Lewis, 151 Wash. Dec. 171, 316
P.2d 907, invloved a review by certiorari of an order of the trial court declaring a
fourteen year old boy to be a delinquent and directing that he be made a ward of the
court. Relators were the parents of the child. Among other things, they claimed that
it was error for the trial court: (1) to appoint a guardian ad litern for the child;
(2) to appoint the guardian without notice to the parents; (3) to appoint a special
prosecutor to represent the probation officer; and (4) to exclude the public from the
hearing on the question of delinquency, over the objections of the parents. The supreme
court, in an opinion by Justice Rosellini, affirmed the order of the trial court.
The court held that a delinquency proceeding is not criminal in nature since there
is no issue of crime or punishment. WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, provides, "Justice in all
cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." The court con-
strued "Justice," as used in that section, to apply only to criminal prosecutions. Since
this proceeding was not a criminal prosecution, it was not error for the trial court to
exclude the public where the judge thought such exclusion would best protect the
interests of the child.
RCW 13.04.070 provides in part that the parents of the child shall be notified of
the proceedings, if they may be found,"... and in any case, the judge shall appoint
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some suitable person or association to act in behalf of the child." Here the parents
were notified of the proceedings concerning the child, but were not notified that the
court was appointing a guardian ad litem for the child. Two earlier cases suggest, but
do not hold, that the above section applies only when the parents are not present. State
cx rel. Raddue v. SUperior Court, 106 Wash. 619, 180 Pac. 875 (1919) ; In re Jones,
41 Wn.2d 764, 252 P.2d 284 (1953). The court here held that where the interests of
the child and of the parents conflict, the trial court may appoint a guardian. The fact
that the parents were given no notice of the appointment, if error, was held to be
harmless, since the parents were given full opportunity to be heard on their motion
to quash the appointment. The parents, in their brief, claimed that they had no knowl-
edge of what occurred at the hearing appointing the guardian, or of the trial court's
grounds for appointing the guardian.
The court also held that while it is the express duty of the probation officer to repre-
sent the interests of the child, this duty is exercised on behalf of the state and county.
Therefore, when the county prosecutor declines to appear to represent the probation
officer, RCW 36.27.030 gives the trial court authority to appoint a special prosecutor.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Direct Support by a Father As a Defense to His Liability For
Non-Payment of Child Support Money. In the recent case of Koon
v. Koon,1 the Washington court held that a father who directly sup-
ported his two minor sons instead of paying child support money to
their mother in accordance with the provisions of a divorce decree
was not thereby discharged from liability for nonpayment of the money
to the mother. The court considered itself bound to follow the earlier
case of Bradley v. Fowler2 In that case a father who directly sup-
ported his children instead of paying child support money to their
mother was held to be in contempt. The divorce decree there in ques-
tion specifically provided that the father was to pay the support money
even during those months when the children, who had been placed in
the custody of their mother, were visting with their father.
In following the Bradley case, the court distinguished the line of
cases including Ditmar v. Ditmar, State ex rel. Meins v. Superior
Court,' and Gainsburg v. Garbarsky.5 Each of those cases had held
a father who had directly supported his children instead of paying
child support money to their mother to be free from liability for non-
payment. They were distinguished as cases involving the express or
implied consent of the mother, as parent-trustee, to payment of sup-
port money in a manner other than directly to her.
The court's holding in the Koon case is bound to add to the confusion
150 Wn.2d 577, 313 P2d 369 (1957).
2 30 Wn2d 609, 192 P.2d 969 (1948).
3 48 Wn.2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956).
4 159 Wash. 277, 292 Pac. 1011 (1930).
5 157 Wash. 537, 289 Pac. 1000 (1930).
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